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Abstract
Explaining or predicting the behaviour of our conspecifics requires the ability to infer the intentions that motivate it. Such
inferences are assumed to rely on two types of information: (1) the sensory information conveyed by movement kinematics
and (2) the observer’s prior expectations – acquired from past experience or derived from prior knowledge. However, the
respective contribution of these two sources of information is still controversial. This controversy stems in part from the fact
that ‘‘intention’’ is an umbrella term that may embrace various sub-types each being assigned different scopes and targets.
We hypothesized that variations in the scope and target of intentions may account for variations in the contribution of
visual kinematics and prior knowledge to the intention inference process. To test this hypothesis, we conducted four
behavioural experiments in which participants were instructed to identify different types of intention: basic intentions (i.e.
simple goal of a motor act), superordinate intentions (i.e. general goal of a sequence of motor acts), or social intentions (i.e.
intentions accomplished in a context of reciprocal interaction). For each of the above-mentioned intentions, we varied (1)
the amount of visual information available from the action scene and (2) participant’s prior expectations concerning the
intention that was more likely to be accomplished. First, we showed that intentional judgments depend on a consistent
interaction between visual information and participant’s prior expectations. Moreover, we demonstrated that this
interaction varied according to the type of intention to be inferred, with participant’s priors rather than perceptual evidence
exerting a greater effect on the inference of social and superordinate intentions. The results are discussed by appealing to
the specific properties of each type of intention considered and further interpreted in the light of a hierarchical model of
action representation.
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Introduction
Intentional inference: perceptual information and
top-down prior knowledge
Explaining or predicting the behaviour of our conspecifics
requires the ability to properly appreciate the causes that motivate
it. As these causes are hidden – intentions, like beliefs or desires,
are unobservable states –, it has long been a matter of speculation
how one may infer them from patterns of visible behaviour alone.
Indeed, visual information conveyed by the movement kinematics
is often noisy, ambiguous or incomplete. As a result, visual
information generally under-constraints the space of candidate
causes (i.e. the many competing intentions) that are logically
consistent with what is observed [1–3]. One way to solve this
problem is to assume that this space of possible intentions is further
constrained by the observer’s prior expectations. These expecta-
tions are derived from prior knowledge that may originate from
the past experience of the viewer (through expertise: [4,5]; or
learning of statistical regularities: [6]), from her intuitive theories
[7,8], or reputational knowledge [9,10], as well as from contextual
information surrounding the action scene [5,11]. This prior
knowledge has been demonstrated to be crucial to account for the
robustness of our everyday inferences [12]. Indeed, it makes
possible inductive inference about the agent’s intentions, even in
cases of noisy signals or incomplete data [13–15].
However, although most authors agree that prior knowledge
and perceptual information both contribute to the process of
inferring intentions, the precise contribution of each type of
information remains controversial [16–23]. The controversy stems
in part from the fact that ‘‘intention’’ is an umbrella term used in
the empirical and philosophical literature to refer to representa-
tions of actions that can differ in both their content and format, as
well as in their temporal properties and in the role they play in the
guidance of actions [24–29]. Intentions can therefore be
distinguished into several sub-types according to one or several
of these factors. In the present study, we propose a typology of
intentions and hypothesize that this typology might be a key
element in understanding how perceptual information and prior
knowledge contribute to the process by which intentions are
inferred.
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The intentional typology we present below is primarily motivated
by the necessity to take into account two dimensions of variation in
the content of intentions that may make an important difference to
the processes involved in their inference. The first dimension of
variation concerns the scope of the intention; i.e., the more-or-less
complex nature of its goal. Here we can draw a distinction between
basic intentions and superordinate intentions. Basic intentions are directed at
simple motor goals (i.e. goals that can be realized by basic actions
such as lifting an arm, pressing a button, or reaching for an object).
These intentions are sensorimotor representations where the goal is
represented directly in terms of the motor commands needed to
achieve it. The relation between basic intention and motor act is
thus one-to-one when that act is successfully completed [17]. In
contrast, superordinate intentions are intentions directed at somewhat
more complex or general goals, the achievement of which typically
involves the completion of a number of subgoals or substeps.
Depending on the complexity of the general goal, these subgoals
may themselves be decomposed into further subgoals, ultimately
reaching the level of basic actions. The achievement of a
superordinate intention will thus require the execution of a
combination of basic actions each guided by a corresponding basic
intention. Different combinations of motor acts can be used to
accomplish the same general goal and, conversely, a same motor act
(or even series of motor acts) can be part of combinations aimed at
different general goals.
The second dimension of variation we were interested in
concerns the target of the intentions. Neither basic nor superordi-
nate intentions are necessarily directed at inanimate objects. They
may also target a third party or be achieved in a context of social
interaction [11,30–33]. The content of intentions is thus also
modulatedbytherelationalstructureinwhichanaction takesplace.
We call intentions directed at an object, non-social intentions, and
intentions directed at a third party, social intentions.
By combining these two dimensions, we obtain the following
typology: i) non-social basic intention, ii) non-social superordinate
intention, iii) social basic intention, and iv) social superordinate
intention. Owing to their different scopes and targets, basic and
superordinate, social and non-social, intentions are naturally
assigned different functional roles, different types of content and
different temporal scales. The present study aims at investigating
whether these functional differences are reflected in the respective
contribution of perceptual information and prior expectations to
intentional judgments.
Overview of the present study
We conducted four experiments in which participants were
requested to identify one intentionunderlyingan action scene. Each
experiment involved one type of intention with a specific scope
(basic vs. superordinate) and a specific target (social vs. non-social).
Interactionsbetweenpriorexpectationsand visualinformationwere
examined within a Bayesian probabilistic framework. This
conceptual framework is particularly well-suited to account for
how accurate predictions on hidden world states are made in
situations where available sensory information does not sufficiently
constrain the number of potential solutions [13,15,34]. Before the
onset of an action sequence, each of the agent’s possible intentions
was first assigned a certain ‘level of belief’, termed a priori probability
(the probability that intention X is the real cause of the observed
behaviour estimated from past experiences). Then the observer
progressively gathers sensory information (visual input) as the action
sequence is disclosed and both sources of information (sensory and a
priori) are combined and used to infer the intention underlying the
observed behaviour. Thus, the process by which intentions are
inferred is considered as reflecting a trade-off between the sensory
information and the prior probability of each candidate intention
[14]. Finally, the chosen intention is that which maximizes the
posterior probability value, i.e. the probability that intention X is true
given what is observed.
In the present study, these two terms – ap r i o r iprobability and
sensory information – were manipulated using a two-step procedure.
Prior expectations the participants had about the agent’s possible
intentionsweremanipulatedbyincreasingtheapr io r iprobabilitythat
one intention (termed likely intention) was achieved,to the detriment of
other intentions (unlikely intentions) with the same scope and target.
Sensory information available from an action scene was then
manipulated in a second step by modulating the degree of
completeness (i.e. the duration) of the action sequences, resulting
in actions scenes with varying amounts of visual information.
We first predicted that judgements about intentions would follow
the general principles of Bayesian inference. Specifically, we
expected that the amount of visual information would interact with
participants’ prior expectations such that the lower the reliability of
the external visual input, the more participants’ responses would
depend upon their own internal expectations. That is, they should
respond more frequently in the direction of the likely intention. And
vice versa, the higher the amount of visual information, the less the
participants should rely on their prior expectations.
Second, we predicted that the shape of the interaction between
these two sources of information would be a function of the type of
intention, depending on both its scope and target. Along the
dimension of the scope, we hypothesised that participants’
judgement about basic intentions should primarily rely on sensory
information available from the action scene. This prediction is
motivated bythepragmaticcontent ofthebasicintention:‘‘grasping
a glass of water’’ directly denotes the corresponding intention of
‘‘grasping that glass’’. In this case, perceiving the action itself – i.e.
processing the associated visual kinematics – is enough to
successfully determine the nature of the underlying intention [35].
On the other hand, we expected performance in judging
superordinate intentions to be significantly influenced by partici-
pants’ prior expectations. As already mentioned, the same sequence
of motor acts can be part of combinations aimed at different general
goals or superordinate intentions. In this specific case, sensory
information carried by movement kinematics is not sufficient to
infer the corresponding intention, as it under-constraints the set of
candidate intentions congruent withthis movement [1,2,17,36]. We
consequently predicted that this perceptual uncertainty should
encourage participants to ‘mistrust’ what they observe and, hence,
to rely more on their prior expectations.
Along the dimension of target, finally, we expected participants’
reliance on their prior expectations to increase when basic and
superordinate intentions are directed at another agent. The
structure of social interaction meets indeed particular, often
irrepressible, expectations, such as those provided by reputational
knowledge [9,10,37]. Indeed, knowledge about individual’s
reputation has been robustly demonstrated to have a strong
impact on predicting how the observed agent will behave [12]. In
line with other recent suggestions, we thus hypothesised that the
weight of these a priori expectations would increase when the
observed action fits into a context of social interaction.
Materials and Methods
Non-social experiments
In the first experiment, participants were instructed to infer the
basic intention (to lift, to rotate, or to transport) of an actor
manipulating meaningless objects (fig. 1, A). In the second
Prior Knowledge in Action Understanding
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e17133experiment, participants were instructed to infer the superordinate
intention (i.e. the general goal) underlying a sequence of motor acts
(fig. 1, B).
Social experiments
The third (fig. 1, C) and fourth experiments (fig. 1, D) presented
two actors engaged in a social game in which they could either
cooperate or defect by coordinating their action (joint-action
condition) or by refusing to join their action to the achievement of
a shared goal (defective condition). Participants were instructed to
infer the nature of the second player’s social intention (i.e.
cooperative or defective intention). In both these experiments, the
bias was assigned according to the way the second player
responded to the strategy adopted by the opponent in the previous
round. Participants were therefore biased towards the reputation
of the second player rather than towards one particular type of
social intention. Finally, as in the two previous non-social
experiments, both basic intentions (single motor acts) and superordinate
intentions (sequences of motor acts leading to the construction of a
shape) were considered in the last two experiments.
Ethics Statement
All participants gave written informed consent for the study
which was approved by the local Ethical Committee (Comite ´d e
Protection des Personnes SUD-EST IV, no. B80631-60).
Experiment 1: non-social basic intention
Participants. 30 healthy subjects (15 males, 15 females,
mean age=35.13, S.D.=9.33 and laterality score mean=0.88,
S.D.=0.31; [38]) participated in this experiment. They all
reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Participants received 10 euros for taking part in the study.
Stimuli. Visual stimuli were incomplete movies representing
an actor’s hand performing a simple manipulation of a
meaningless object. The duration of the video sequences was
varied on 4 distinct levels, ranging from 1480 ms to 1880 ms after
movement onset. Each movie was characterized by one basic
intention (to transport, to rotate, or to lift an object) and
participants were instructed to infer the basic intention in each
video. There were three white rectangular objects of similar size
(3 cm66 cm) and orientation, positioned at equal distance
(16.8 cm) from the starting position of the actor’s hand (figure 1,
A). All the movies were performed by a single actor and only
featured her naked arm. Each action was performed as often with
one object as with the others.
Movies were equalized for temporal homogeneity (see Sup-
porting Text S1, part 1, and Figure S1). Furthermore, all the
movies were unique, i.e., they were presented only once to prevent
any influence of memorized kinematic parameters on participants’
performance in the experiment.
Procedure. Participants were comfortably sat at a distance of
60 cm from a 190 computer monitor. Each trial started with the
observation of an incomplete movie, and then a response screen
appeared for 2500 ms representing the first letter of each possible
intention (T for ‘transport’, L for ‘lift’, or R for ‘rotate’).
Participants were requested to respond by pressing, as quickly
and accurately as possible, one of the three keyboard presses
corresponding to the three possible intentions. Once a response
was given, the next trial started.
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli for each of the four experiments. BASIC NON-SOCIAL intention experiment (A); SUPERORDINATE NON-SOCIAL intention
experiment (B); BASIC SOCIAL intention experiment (C); SUPERORDINATE SOCIAL intention experiment (D). The black cross indicates the starting position of the
hand.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g001
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baseline session was characterized by a flat (unbiased) prior
probability distribution with all basic intentions having the same
probability. In a second bias session, participants were biased
towards one intention (likely intention, 55%) to the detriment of
the others (unlikely intentions, 22% each). The bias was randomly
assigned so that each basic intention was equally biased across
participants.
In both sessions, trials were organized into OVERT blocks in
which movies consisted of a constant and very high amount of
visual information (1880 ms), alternating with COVERT blocks in
which movies consisted of varying and lower amounts of visual
information presented in a random order (LOW=1480 ms, MOD-
ERATE=1560 ms, and HIGH=1640) (see Supporting Text S1,
part 2, for the selection of these amounts of visual informa-
tion[58,59]; Figure S2). Each experimental sequence (one overt
block followed by one covert block) was repeated 9 times over each
session (see figure 2, A) and each participant performed the trials
in a different random order.
The reason for block interleaving was that it enabled us to
maintain the bias constant across the bias session. Indeed, by
regularly inserting overt blocks of movies with different probabil-
ities, we ensured that participants were continuously biased
towards one intention over the whole session. Furthermore, even
though the baseline session did not include any bias assignment,
and therefore was not concerned with bias maintenance, it
contained the same trial organization (block interleaving) to allow
a direct comparison of the performance between the two sessions.
Prior to running the experiment, participants undertook a
training session to get familiar with the task. The training consisted
of 3 baseline experimental sequences (non-biased probability
distribution) with interleaved blocks. The 72 movies (3624)
presented during the training session were distinct from those
used in the experiment.
Design and statistical analyses. One group of statistical
analyses was performed for each session independently (base-
line and bias sessions), on the two dependant variables
(participants’ hits and reaction times for correct responses). In
the overt blocks of the baseline session, one two-tailed t-test was
conducted on participants’ reaction times (RTs) between the
future ‘likely’ intention (the one towards which participants were
subsequently biased in the bias session) and the future ‘unlikely’
intentions. The same test was conducted in the bias session
between likely and unlikely intentions. In the covert blocks, a
263 repeated-measures ANOVA was performed for each session
on both RTs and hits. The first two-level factor was the bias
(future ‘likely’ vs. future ‘unlikely’ intentions OR likely vs.
unlikely intention) and the second three-level factor was the
amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE and HIGH). Post-
hoc Fisher tests were then performed to identify differences
between conditions.
Another group of analyses was conducted in order to assess the
magnitude of the bias effect on participants’ performance. To do
so, we looked at whether increasing the probability of one
intention concomitantly affected the selection of intentions with
lower probability. Two-tailed t-tests on RTs and hits for unlikely
intentions were thus performed between the baseline and the bias
sessions. We predicted that selecting an unlikely intention should
be more demanding in the bias session – as it concomitantly
requires inhibiting a competing biased intention – than in the
baseline session, where all intentions had the same probability of
occurring. In the following, the resulting ‘‘cost’’ (i.e. increased RTs
and decreased hits for unlikely intentions) was considered as an
indirect measure of the bias effect.
For all analyses, a p,.05 was taken as the criterion for
significance and an eta squared (g ´) was used as a measure of effect
size. These analyses were performed using the statistical software
Statistica 7 (www.statsoft.com).
Experiment 2: non-social superordinate intention
Participants. 30 new participants (15 males, 15 females,
mean age=36.59, S.D.=8.12 and laterality score mean =0.79,
S.D.=0.19) took part in this experiment. They all reported
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and received 10 euros
for taking part in the study.
Stimuli. As with the non-social basic experiment, test
material consisted of incomplete movie clips showing an actor’s
hand manipulating meaningless objects. However, contrary to
experiment 1, movies in the superordinate experiment represented
a sequence of three successive manipulations (to transport, rotate, or
lift the object) leading to the construction of a meaningless shape.
Each sequence was therefore characterized by an underlying
superordinate intention, represented by one final shape (s1, s2 or
s3). The objects used in the first experiment were also used in this
second experiment (figure 1, B). The first action was performed on
one of the three objects, the second action on one of the two
objects left, and the third action on the remaining object. After
each action, the hand came back to the starting position. The
incompleteness of the video sequences was controlled so that the
duration of the last action was varied on 3 distinct levels (1480 ms,
1560 ms or 1640 ms after this action starts). All the movies were
made with the same actor as in experiment 1. Finally, temporal
homogeneity of the movies was controlled and each trial was
unique.
Procedure. The organization of the trials was the same as in
the non-social basic experiment (see figure 2, B, ‘Superordinate
exp.’). However, the task was further constrained. First, to ensure
that participants paid attention to the overall sequence of actions,
they were asked to identify what the last (not-yet completed) action
of this sequence was, by pressing as quickly and accurately as
possible, one of the three corresponding keyboard presses (T, L, or
R). This response depended upon having inferred the
superordinate intention of this sequence (i.e. the final shape
being achieved by a set of three successive actions). Second, to
ensure that participants were biased towards the superordinate
intention itself and not towards the last final action only,
commutative sequences were used so that each shape could be
constructed from distinct sequences of actions sets. Sequences
shown in the covert blocks were thus distinct from those used in
the overt blocks (e.g. the shape s1 could be obtained from the
sequence ‘lift-lift-rotate’ in an overt block, but from the sequence
‘lift-rotate-lift’ in a covert block). Finally, the intention could not be
inferred solely from the motor acts composing the sequence.
Indeed, although the probability of each shape being constructed
was manipulated in the bias session (i.e. one particular shape had a
higher probability), the probabilities of the individual actions (lift,
rotate, or transport) were held equal at each step of that sequence.
Finally a training session was conducted with movies distinct from
those used in the experimental sessions.
Experiment 3: social basic intention
Participants. 30 novel subjects (15 males, 15 females, mean
age =32.9, S.D.=10, and laterality score mean =0.80,
S.D.=0.11) participated in this experiment. They all reported
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and received 10 euros
for taking part in the study.
Stimuli. Visual stimuli consisted of incomplete movies
showing two players’ hands (opposite each other) manipulating
Prior Knowledge in Action Understanding
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e17133Figure 2. Experimental designs. Examples of a typical experimental sequence (one OVERT block followed by one COVERT block) used in both the
baseline and the bias sessions. OVERT blocks (O): 18 movies with a very high and constant amount of visual information (1880 ms). COVERT blocks (C):
9 movies with three amounts of visual information (1480, 1560, and 1640 ms). In the 4 experiments, the probability of all intentions was held equal
across the block, except in OVERT blocks of the bias session, where one particular intention had a greater probability to be accomplished than the
other ones. In the BASIC exp., subjects had to identify a single action (labels: L: ‘‘lift’’ action; R: ‘‘rotate’’ action; T: ‘‘transport’’ action). In the
SUPERORDINATE exp., subjects had to identify the final action (red letter) of a sequence leading to shape 1, 2, or 3 (s1: shape 1). In the
SUPERORD. SOCIAL exp., subjects had to identify the action of the second player (red letter) leading to configuration 1, 2, 3, or 4 (c1: configuration
1). In both BASIC and SUPERORD. SOCIAL exp., the action or the configuration achieved by each player indicated either a cooperative or a
defective strategy (CO: cooperate; DF: defect). In each experiment, a probabilistic bias was assigned to one particular action (basic), shape
(superordinate) or strategy (social). The red interrogation mark indicates the action (basic: single action; superordinate: last action of the sequence)
for which the amount of visual information varied.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g002
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were placed on the sides of a grid that was situated in the centre of
the scene (figure 1, C). The objects were of similar size
(5.8 cm65.8 cm) and located at equal distance from the starting
position of each player’s hand (figure 1, C). The two actors played
one after the other by moving the object towards the middle of the
grid (termed ‘bank’) or by rotating it so that it remained at its own
place. Movies were partitioned so that the last action (i.e. the
action performed by the second player) was incomplete (1480 ms,
1560 ms, or 1640 ms after the last action starts).Here, each motor
act directly denoted the social intention of the player: each player
could either cooperate with the other one, by moving the object
towards the central bank (transport), or defect, by leaving the
object at its own place (rotate). Consequently, there were four
possible combinations of intentions, or strategies: either both
players cooperated (transport/transport) or defected (rotate/
rotate), or the first player defected and the second cooperated
(rotate/transport), or the first player cooperated and the second
defected (transport/rotate). Finally, temporal homogeneity of the
movies was controlled and each trial was unique.
Procedure. For each trial, participants were instructed to
observe the incomplete movie and infer what the last action (i.e.
the one performed by the second player) was. This response
required the participant to have inferred the second player’s
intention (to defect or to cooperate) which itself depended upon
the first player’s strategy. Participants were asked to give their
answer by pressing, as quickly and accurately as possible, one of
the two keyboard keys corresponding to the two possible last
actions (T for ‘transport’, or R for ‘rotate’) susceptible to achieve
the second player’s intention. Once a response was given, the next
trial started.
In the baseline session, all combinations of strategies were
counterbalanced over the blocks (i.e. whatever the first player did
the second player was just as likely to defect or to cooperate). In
the bias session, on the other hand, the probability that the second
player did whatever the opponent did in the previous round was
increased, thus biasing participants to perceive the second actor as
a ‘‘tit-for-tat’’ player (i.e. as being more inclined to cooperate if the
first player had previously cooperated, and to defect if the first
player had previously defected). The rationale for biasing the
second player’s reputation in such a way was twofold. First, tit-for-
tat (TFT) reputation implies that individuals respond to their
opponent’s actions in a mirrored (i.e. correlated) fashion.
Therefore, successfully predicting intentions of a TFT-like player
necessarily involves taking into account what the first player has
done, and by consequence, ensured that participants paid
attention to the whole sequence of actions (both actor 19s play
and actor 29s play). Second, contrary to other common types of
reputation such as ‘‘always defect’’, or ‘‘always cooperate’’, TFT
may equally imply cooperative as well as defective strategies. The
probability that the second actor behaves as a tit-for-tat player
could thus be increased without otherwise increasing the
probability of one intention (e.g. cooperate) to the detriment of
the other one (e.g. defect). Holding equal the probability of both
these strategies was here crucial to nullify their potential kinematic
differences on participants’ performance (see [39]) and also to
avoid stereotyped responses (e.g. always responding ‘cooperate’ or
‘defect’). Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy is known to be a more
intuitive and successful strategy than alternative ones, such as
‘‘always cooperating’’, ‘‘always defecting’’ or ‘‘acting randomly’’
[40–42]. We thus chose to experimentally strengthen this already
existing a priori bias by increasing the probability that the second
player’s action mirrors her opponent’s one while holding equal
both the probability of each single act (to rotate or to transport)
and the overall probability of each intention (to defect or to
cooperate) (figure 2, C, ‘Social Basic exp.’). Thus, in the baseline
session, the second player was as likely to play tit-for-tat as she was
to play the other types of strategy. In the bias session, however, the
probability that the second actor played tit-for-tat was increased so
that she was more likely to cooperate (rather than defect) if the first
player had previously cooperated, and to defect (rather than
cooperate) if the first player had previously cooperated. Finally a
training session was conducted with movies distinct from those
used in the experimental sessions.
Experiment 4: social superordinate intention
Participants. 30 novel participants (15 males, 15 females,
mean age =34.27, S.D.=9.42, and laterality score mean =0.83,
S.D.=0.26) participated in this last experiment. They all reported
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and received 10 euros
for taking part in the study.
Stimuli. As in the social basic experiment, the stimuli of this
last experiment represented two players’ hands manipulating
objects. However, in the present experiment, the actors played in
turn with the goal of vertically aligning three objects (see figure 1,
D). The goal of the first player was to align the objects according to
the color (red), irrespective of the orientation, while the goal of the
second player was to align the objects according to the orientation,
irrespective of the color. A third configuration could be obtained
by the alignment of the objects according to both the orientation
and the color. As in the social basic experiment, the two social
intentions were of a defective or a cooperative nature. However, in
the present experiment, the social intention was denoted by the
sequence of the players’ motor acts (i.e. the final configuration),
rather than by the single action performed by each player. Indeed,
a defective or a cooperative strategy could be equally achieved by
rotating or transporting the object. Each player could adopt a
defective strategy by manipulating the object in such a way that it
prevented the creation of one configuration, or adopt a
cooperative strategy in order to achieve another configuration.
The four possible final configurations were therefore: either both
players defected (configuration 3) or cooperated (configuration 4),
or the first player defected and the second cooperated
(configuration 1), or the first player cooperated and the second
defected (configuration 2). As for previous experiments, only the
last action (i.e. the action performed by the second player) was
made incomplete (1480 ms, 1560 ms or 1640 ms). Finally,
temporal homogeneity of the movies was controlled and each
trial was unique.
Procedure. Participants were instructed to infer the social
superordinate intention of the second player by indicating which
action allowed the accomplishment of that intention. A correct
response therefore required having correctly inferred the second
player’s intention (to defect or to cooperate) which itself depended
upon the first player’s strategy. Participants were asked to give
their answer by pressing, as quickly and accurately as possible, one
of the two keyboard keys corresponding to the two possible actions
(T for ‘transport’ or R for ‘rotate’) congruent with the second
player’s social intention. The organization of trials in the social
superordinate experiment was the same as for the social basic
experiment (see figure 2, D). Tit-for-tat reputation (i.e. the second
player did whatever the opponent did in the previous round) was
chosen to be biased across participants. Likewise, commutative
sequences were also used so that each pattern could be obtained
from distinct sequences of actions ensuring that the different
strategies could not be predicted from motor acts solely.
Furthermore, both the overall probability of each strategy
(cooperative or defective) and each action (to rotate or to
Prior Knowledge in Action Understanding
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session was conducted with movies distinct from those used in the
experimental sessions.
‘Bias effect’: between-experiment comparisons
Finally, some analyses were conducted to directly assess whether
the contribution of prior knowledge to the inference of an
intention depended upon the target (basic vs. superordinate) and
the scope (non-social vs. social) of the intention. Student tests were
first conducted on the overall performance in the bias session
between the basic experiments and the superordinate ones, and
between the non-social experiments and the social ones. Second,
the bias effects for each dimension (scope and target) were
compared with each other. A score reflecting the effect of each
type of intention (basic, superordinate, social, non-social intention)
was calculated by subtracting, in each experiment, participants’ hit
rate for the likely intention from the hit rate for the unlikely
intentions. The resulting scores were then entered in a 2 (basic vs.
superordinate) 62 (social vs. non-social) 63 (amounts of
information) factorial ANOVA.
Results
Experiment 1: non-social basic intention
For each session, two-tailed t-tests were performed between the
two unlikely intentions on both RTs and hits. As no significant
differences appeared (all p..05), performances for these two
unlikely intentions were pooled for subsequent analyses.
Overt blocks. As expected, participants performed the task
well when the amount of visual information was very high
(percentage of mean correct responses =98%, S.D.=2.4, and
96.8%, S.D.=3.4 in the baseline and the bias sessions,
respectively). Furthermore, in the baseline session, there were no
significant differences among hits and RTs between the (future)
‘likely intention’ (i.e. the one towards which participants will be
biased in the subsequent bias session) and the ‘unlikely intention’,
indicating that prior to biasing participants, there was no a priori
bias towards one intention rather than another (two-tailed t-tests,
all p.0.2, see figure 3, ‘Basic exp.’, baseline session).
The only significant difference was found in the bias session,
with faster RTs for the likely intention vs. unlikely intentions (two-
tailed t-tests, all p,.001). Subsequent analyses of RTs across time
were carried out by independently comparing RTs for likely basic
intention and RTs for unlikely basic intentions across the different
blocks. The bias was found to have a cumulative effect over time,
with RTs for the likely intention progressively decreasing up to
block 8 (minimal RT=337 ms) and then remaining constant
until the end of the session (blocks 1–3 vs. blocks 4–6: t=3.09,
p,.005; blocks 4–6 vs. blocks 7–9: t=2.08, p,.05) (see figure 3,
‘Basic exp.’).
Covert Blocks. The 3 (amounts of information)62 (likely vs.
unlikely intentions) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
significant effects on both participants’ RTs and hits. In the
baseline session, a significant effect of the amount of visual
information was obtained (RTs: F(2,116)=167.13, p,.001,
g ´ =0.74, and hits: F(2,116)=277.44, p,.001, g ´ =0.82). As
expected, RTs were found to decrease and hits to improve as
the amount of visual information increased. There were, however,
no significant effects of the intention presented (future ‘likely’ or
future ‘unlikely’ intention) nor of the interaction between the
intention and the amount of visual information (both p.0.05),
showing that improved performance for higher amounts of
information was independent of the presented intention (Im1,
Im2, or Im3) (see table 1 and figure 4, ‘Baseline session’).
In the bias session, in addition to the effect of amount of visual
information (RTs: F(2,116)=98.8, p,.001, g ´ =0.62; hits:
(F(2,116)=190.92, p,.001, g ´ =0.76), an effect of the bias (RTs:
F(1,58)=18.51, p,.001, g ´ =0.24; hits: (F(1,58)=19.81, p,.001,
g ´ =0.25) as well as of the interaction (RTs: F(2,116)=13.98,
p,.001, g ´ =0.19; hits: F(2,116)=5.44, p=.005, g ´ =0.08) were
also observed. Post-hoc tests indicated that participants were
more accurate and faster in recognizing the likely intention in
low information condition only (LSD Fisher tests, RTs: LOW =
p,.001; MODERATE =p ,.005 and HIGH = ns; Hits: LOW =
p,.001; MODERATE = ns. and HIGH = ns.) (see table 1 and figure 4,
‘Bias session’).
Effect of the bias on the unlikely intention. We were also
interested in evaluating the influence of the bias on the selection of
the unlikely intentions. Comparing the performance for the
unlikely intention between the two sessions revealed no
significant differences for any amount of visual information (two-
tailed t-tests, RTs and hits: all p.0.05). This result indicates that
switching from the baseline to the bias session (i.e. increasing the
probability of one intention to the detriment of others) did not
significantly affect the inference of basic intentions with lower
probabilities.
Preliminary discussion. As expected, basic intentions were
better inferred as the actions were presented with a high amount of
visual information. Performances were also influenced by the
probability distribution of the intentions, with a significant increase
in participants’ hits and decrease in RTs for the likely (i.e. biased)
intention. Finally, the bias significantly interacted with the amount
of visual information: participants responded more often towards
the likely intention when action scenes were presented with a low
amount of visual information. When the amount of visual
information was sufficient, prior expectations then exerted less
influence on intention inference.
Experiment 2: non-social superordinate intention
Statistical analyses were similar to those conducted in the first
experiment. Responses for the two unlikely superordinate
intentions were pooled for subsequent analyses as there were no
significant differences among both hits and RTs between these
responses (for each session, two-tailed t-tests, p.0.15).
Overt blocks. As for experiment 1, participants performed
the task well when the amount of visual information was very high
(1880 ms), in both the baseline (mean correct responses
percentage: 98.6%, S.D.=2.3) and the bias sessions (percentage
of mean correct responses: 98.1%, S.D.=3.1). Furthermore, in the
baseline session participants were equally rapid at inferring the last
action of the sequence, whatever the superordinate intention being
accomplished (two-tailed t-tests, all p..35).
In the bias session, however, although there were no significant
differences among hits between likely and unlikely intentions, RTs
for the likely intention were found to significantly decrease (two-
tailed t-tests, likely vs. unlikely intentions, all p,.001). This
decrease increased over time as revealed by a cumulative effect of
the bias across blocks. Indeed, RTs decreased up to block 7
(minimal RT=424 ms) and then remained constant until the
end of the session (blocks 1–3 vs. blocks 4–6: t=4.04, p,.001;
blocks 4–6 vs. blocks 7–9: t=0.83, p..05) (see figure 3,
‘Superordinate exp.’).
Covert blocks. In both the baseline and the bias sessions, the
amount of visual information significantly affected participants’
hits and latencies with decreased RTs (baseline: F(2,116)=423,68,
p,.001, g ´ =0.87; bias session: (F(2,116)=523.9, p,.001; g ´ =0.9)
and a greater number of hits as the amount of visual information
increased (baseline: F(2,116)=249.18, p,.001, g ´ =0.81; bias
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figure 5).
In the bias session, a significant effect of the bias was also
observed with faster RTs and increased hits for actions congruent
with the likely superordinate intention (RTs: F(1,58)=47.04,
p,.001, g ´ =0.44; and hits: F(1,58)=62.09, p,.001, g ´ =0.51).
Finally, the bias was found to significantly interact with the
amount of visual information in such a way that the number of hits
was significantly higher and RTs faster for the likely intention as
the amount of visual information decreased (RTs: F(2,116)=15.3,
Figure 3. OVERT blocks: mean reaction times of the likely and the unlikely intentions across time. Baseline and bias sessions: (1-3): the
first three overt blocks of the session; (4-6) the intermediate three blocks; and (7-9) the three last blocks of the session.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g003
Table 1. NON-SOCIAL BASIC intention experiment (COVERT blocks).
Experiment Hits (%) RTs (ms)
Session Intention LOW MODERATE HIGH LOW MODERATE HIGH
BASIC
Baseline Unlikely 42.5611.6 63.3614.7 94.767 11536303 8946205 5796193
Likely 44.4620.6 66611.9 93.8610.2 10926288 8666247 6016143
Bias Unlikely 38.3614.7 62.2615.4 91.368 11906380 9756294 6286206
Likely 57.2617.3 69.4615.8 95.567.4 8176270 6596223 5526159
Mean reaction times (6 SD) for likely and unlikely intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.t001
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Post-hoc tests further indicated that participants were more
accurate and faster in recognizing the likely intention in both
low and moderate amount of visual information conditions (LSD
Fisher: LOW,p ,.001; MODERATE, p=.005, HIGH,p ,.05 for RTs;
and LOW,p ,.001; MODERATE,p ,.001; HIGH = ns. for hits) (see
table 2 and figure 5, ‘Bias session’).
Effect of the bias on the unlikely intention. The number
of correct responses for unlikely intentions significantly decreased
in the bias session, compared to the baseline session, for both low
and moderate amounts of visual information (two-tailed t-tests: all
t(30).2.33, all p,0.02). Likewise, RTs significantly decreased in
the moderate amount of visual information condition (two-tailed t-
tests: t(30)=22.09, p=0.04).
Preliminary discussion. Two results make the present
experiment diverge from the previous one. First, the bias effect
was greater in the second experiment, as it was observed in
condition of low amount of visual information as well as in
condition of moderate amount of information. Second, a ‘switch
effect’ was also observed in both these conditions, with an
increasing number of correct responses and decreasing latencies
for the likely intention, accompanied by decreased hits and
increased RTs for the unlikely intentions. This effect reflects the
cost associated with the selection of an unlikely superordinate
intention. Indeed, the increasing difficulty in disengaging from
prior expectations to select a less privileged representation (i.e.
unlikely intentions) reveals the greater extent to which participants
rely on the bias for making their response.
Experiment 3: social basic intention
Statistical analyses were similar to those conducted in the
previous experiments. Two-tailed t-tests revealed no significant
differences among both participants’ RTs and hits between the
TFT intentions (coop/coop vs. def/def: two-tailed t-tests, all
p..2) and between the alternative ones (coop/def vs. def/coop,
two-tailed t-tests, all p..15). Performances for def/def were
therefore pooled with those of coop/coop (i.e. TFT or likely
intentions) and performances for def/coop were pooled with
those of coop/def (i.e. alternative or unlikely intentions) for the
subsequent analyses.
Overt blocks. Participants performed the task well in both
the baseline and the bias sessions (percentage mean correct
responses: 98%, and S.D.=2.5 and S.D.=2.8). In the baseline
session, RT analyses revealed a significant effect of the type of
reputation, with participants being faster at inferring an action that
was embedded within a tit-for-tat strategy than within an
Figure 4. NON-SOCIAL BASIC intention experiment (COVERT blocks). Mean percentage of correct responses (6 SD) for likely (red) and unlikely
(blue) intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g004
Table 2. NON-SOCIAL SUPERORDINATE intention experiment (COVERT blocks).
Experiment Hits (%) RTs (ms)
Session Intention LOW MODERATE HIGH LOW MODERATE HIGH
SUPERORDINATE
Baseline Unlikely 50615 68.7612.1 9766.3 16056314 12416218 7456153
Likely 48.3615.9 70615.2 96.668.6 16766304 12116244 7836128
Bias Unlikely 40.8615.7 61.6612.2 93.3611.7 16896307 13576262 8096161
Likely 65614 77.5612 98.765 12216209 10146183 6006138
Mean reaction times (6 SD) for likely and unlikely intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.t002
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tailed t-tests, all p,.05). Crucially, this result confirmed the
existence of an inherent preference towards TFT reputation. This
effect was maintained after the bias assignment as revealed by
faster RTs for the likely intention (i.e. the TFT intention) in the
bias session (two-tailed t-tests, likely vs. unlikely intentions, all
p,.001). However, RTs for likely intentions did not significantly
decrease with time (blocks 1–3 vs. blocks 4–6: t=0.35, p..05;
blocks 4–6 vs. blocks 7–9: t=20.68, p..05) (see figure 3, ‘Social
Basic exp.’).
Covert blocks. Baseline session. ANOVAs performed on both
hits and RTs showed a significant main effect of the amount of
visual information with decreased RTs (F(2,116)=80.44, p,.001;
g ´ =.58) and a greater number of hits (F(2,116)=209.02, p,.001,
g ´ =.78) as the amount of visual information increased. In
addition, the main effect of the type of reputation – previously
observed in the overt blocks – was also significant in the covert
blocks among RTs only (F (1, 58) =4.7, p,.05, g ´ =.07). The
second player’s action was more rapidly inferred when it was
embedded within a TFT intention than within an ‘‘always
defecting’’ or an ‘‘always cooperating’’ intention. The type of
reputation did not, however, interact with the amount of visual
information (see table 3 and figure 6, ‘Baseline session’’).
Bias session. There were significant main effects of the amount of
visual information and of the bias on both the RTs (main effect of
amount of visual information: F(2,116)=114.49, p,.001, g ´ =.66;
main effect of the bias, F(1,58)=25.29, p,.001, g ´ =.3) and the
hits (main effect of amount of visual information:
F(2,116)=170.34, p,.001, g ´ =.74; main effect of the bias,
F(1,58)=34.75, p,.001, g ´ =.37), as well as a significant effect
of the interaction between these two factors (RTs: F(2,116)=9.23,
p,.001, g ´ =.13; hits: F(2,116)=8.28, p,.001, g ´ =.12). Partici-
pants’ performance (slower RTs and higher hits) for actions
congruent with a biased (i.e. likely) social intention improved as the
amount of visual information decreased. Furthermore, the bias
significantly affected participants’ hits for all amounts of
information (LSD Fisher: LOW,p ,.001; MODERATE, p=.005;
HIGH,p =ns for RTs; LOW,p ,.001; MODERATE, p=.05; HIGH,
p=.05 for hits) (see table 3 and figure 6, ‘Bias session’).
Effect of the bias on the unlikely intention. When
comparing performance for unlikely intentions between the
baseline and the bias sessions, we found significant differences
between these sessions for a high amount of visual information
only, with participants’ RTs for unlikely intentions significantly
decreasing in this condition (two-tailed t-tests: t(30)=2.26,
p=0.03).
Figure 5. NON-SOCIAL SUPERORDINATE intention experiment (COVERT blocks). Mean percentage of correct responses (6 SD) for likely (red) and
unlikely (blue) intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g005
Table 3. SOCIAL BASIC intention experiment (COVERT blocks).
Experiment Hits (%) RTs (ms)
Session Intention LOW MODERATE HIGH LOW MODERATE HIGH
SOCIAL BASIC
Baseline Unlikely 45.8613.4 66.6611.7 90.869.3 11596263 9906220 8886210
Likely 52.2612.5 68612.3 92.267.5 10536232 8996213 7506169
Bias Unlikely 41.6617.3 66.3614.4 86.6611.6 12176297 10416282 7886229
Likely 64.9613.7 75.2610.6 95.566.4 8466220 7486216 6076158
Mean reaction times (6 SD) for likely and unlikely intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.t003
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experiment diverge from the two previous ones. First, in the
baseline session, where no bias was assigned, participants were
faster at predicting an action associated with a tit-for-tat (TFT)
intention. Interestingly, this early preference for TFT strategies
differed from several aspects of the probabilistic bias that was
imposed on participants in the second session. Not only did this
preference not interact with the amount of visual information but
its effect on performance remained constant over time. Second,
the effect of the probabilistic bias was significant for any amount of
visual information showing that prior expectations contributed to
the inference even in conditions in which the visual information
was highly reliable. By increasing the probability that the second
player does whatever the opponent did in the previous round, we
forced participants to perceive the second player as a ‘tit-for-tat’
player, rather than an altruist (always cooperate), an egoistic
(always defect), or a ‘random’ player, hence generating
progressively reinforced expectations that might prevail on
relevant perceptual cues – as it is the case in conditions of high
amount of visual information.
Experiment 4: social superordinate intention
Statistical analyses were similar to those conducted in the first
three experiments. Two-tailed t-tests revealed no significant
differences among both participants’ RTs and hits between the
two likely combinations (coop/coop vs. def/def: two-tailed t-tests,
all p..2) and between the two unlikely combinations (coop/def vs.
def/coop, two-tailed t-tests, all p..15). Performances for def/def
were therefore pooled with those of coop/coop (TFT or likely
intentions) and performances for def/coop were pooled with those
of coop/def (unlikely intentions).
Overt blocks. Participants performed the task well in both the
baseline (percentage mean correct responses: 97.5%, S.D.=2.8)
and the bias sessions (percentage mean correct responses: 98.4%,
S.D.=2.6). In the baseline session, RT analyses revealed a
significant effect of the type of reputation (two-tailed t-tests, all
p,.05), with participants being faster at inferring an action that was
embedded within a tit-for-tat strategy than within an alternative
strategy (i.e. always defect or always coop). RTs for the likely
intention also significantly decreased in the bias session (two-tailed t-
tests, likely vs. unlikely intentions, all p,.001) and this decrease was
found to increase over time up to block 6 (minimal RT=369 ms),
(blocks1–3 vs.blocks4–6:t=22.11,p,.05;blocks4–6vs.blocks7–
9: t=20.44, p..05) (see figure 3, ‘Social superord. exp.’’).
Covert blocks. Baseline session. As the amount of visual
information increased, decreased RTs (F(2,116)=93.23, p,.001,
g ´ =.61) and increased hits (F(2,116)=281.6, p,.001, g ´ =.82)
were observed for actions accomplishing the likely social intention.
In addition, as in the overt blocks, actions were better and more
rapidly inferred when they were embedded within a tit-for-tat
strategy than within an alternative strategy (RTs: F(1,58,)=4.16,
p,.05, g ´ =.06, and hits: F(1,58)=7.96, p,.01, g ´ =.12). The
effect of reputation did not, however, interact with the amount of
visual information showing that the type of strategy affected
participants’ performance independently of the amount of visual
information (see table 4 and figure 7, ‘Baseline session’).
Bias session. There were significant main effects of the amount of
visual information and of the bias on both the RTs (main effect of
amount of visual information: F(2,116)=163.11, p,.001, g ´ =.73;
main effect of the bias F(1,58)=52.03, p,.001, g ´ =.47) and
the hits (main effect of amount of visual information:
F(2,116)=198.77, p,.001, g ´ =.77; main effect of the bias
F(1,58)=92.16, p,.001, g ´ =.61), as well as a significant effect
of the interaction between these two factors (RTs:
F(2,116)=27.74, p,.001, g ´ =.32, and hits: F(2,116)=4.41,
p=.01, g ´ =.07). Participants’ performance (slower RTs and
higher percentage of hits) for likely social intentions improved to
a large extent as the amount of visual information decreased,
although the bias effect was observed for all amounts of visual
information as revealed by the Post-hoc (LSD Fisher: LOW,
p,.001; MODERATE,p ,.001; HIGH, p=.01 for RTs and LOW,
p,.001; MODERATE,p ,.001; HIGH,p ,.001 for hits) (see table 4
and figure 7, ‘Bias session’).
Effect of the bias on the unlikely intention. We found that
reaction times for unlikely intentions significantly increased in the
bias session, compared to the baseline session, for all amounts of
visual information (two-tailed t-tests: all t(30),22.07, all p,0.05).
The number of correct responses for unlikely intentions also
significantly decreased in the bias session, for both low and high
amounts of visual information (two-tailed t-tests: all t(30).2.33, all
Figure 6. SOCIAL BASIC intention experiment (COVERT blocks). Mean percentage of correct responses (6 SD) for likely (red) and unlikely (blue)
intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g006
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amount of visual information condition (two-tailed t-test:
t(30)=1.8, p=0.07).
Preliminary discussion. As for the social basic experiment,
the bias effect was of major importance. First, in the baseline
session, analyses of latencies and accuracy data revealed that, prior
to the bias assignment, participants exhibited an early preference
for social intentions congruent with a tit-for-tat reputation.
Second, in the bias session, the bias significantly impacted on
performances for all amounts of visual information revealing an
increase in the difficulty with which the observer could disengage
from his prior expectations, even in the case where these
expectations interfered with the visual cues (e.g. in condition of
high amount of visual information). Consistent with this
interpretation is the observation that participants’ hits for the
unlikely intentions were found to significantly decrease in the bias
session – as the selection of these unlikely intentions required
inhibiting the activation of the likely intention representation.
‘Bias effect’: between-experiment comparisons
Contrasting the overall performance between experiments
revealed no significant differences, showing that overall partici-
pants performed at comparable levels across the four experiments.
Comparing the bias effect between experiments revealed signifi-
cant effects of both the scope and the target of the intention. The
bias effect was indeed significantly increased for the superordinate
intention compared with the basic intention (F(1,116)=8.36,
p,.005, g ´ =.81) and for the social intention compared with the
non-social intention (F(1,116)=5.06, p=.02, g ´ =.61). Further-
more, these differences were observed for different amounts of
information according to the dimension itself. Indeed, along the
scope dimension, the bias had a significantly greater effect when
inferring a superordinate intention than a basic one in the
conditions with a moderate amount of visual information (post-hoc
Fisher test, p=.014). Along the target dimension, on the other
hand, the only significant difference was observed for a high
amount of visual information with a greater bias effect for inferring
social intentions than non-social ones (post-hoc Fisher test,
p=.0035) (see figure 8).
Preliminary discussion. Comparing the bias effect across
the four experiments, two main results emerged. First, con-
sistent with the previous results, we found that the bias
differentially affected performance according to the scope and
the target of the intention. The bias effect was indeed
significantly more important in superordinate conditions than
in basic ones and in social conditions than in non-social ones.
Second, this effect varied according to the amount of visual
information available to the participants. It was significantly
Figure 7. SOCIAL SUPERORDINATE intention experiment (COVERT blocks). Mean percentage of correct responses (6 SD) for likely (red) and
unlikely (blue) intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g007
Table 4. SOCIAL SUPERORDINATE intention experiment (COVERT blocks).
Experiment Hits (%) RTs (ms)
Session Intention LOW MODERATE HIGH LOW MODERATE HIGH
SOCIAL SUPERORD.
Baseline Unlikely 44.1614.5 62.4611.5 86.169.1 12826288 10496237 8776198
Likely 53612.7 68.3612.2 90.567.8 11026277 9576217 8166175
Bias Unlikely 36.1615.2 56.3614.6 80.2611.8 14886328 11976271 9616230
Likely 64.1612.2 76.1611.7 97.265.9 9236219 7856192 7046151
Mean reaction times (6 SD) for likely and unlikely intentions for each amount of visual information (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.t004
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intentions in condition of moderate amount of visual
information and greater for social intentions compared to non-
social intentions in condition of high amount of visual
information.
Discussion
The present study aimed at investigating how two distinct
sources of information – perceptual (bottom-up) evidence and prior
(top-down) expectations – interact to enable one to make an
intentional inference. To do so, we manipulated the participants’
prior expectations about the probability of the underlying
intention while varying the amount of visual information in the
action scene. Our second purpose was to determine whether the
contribution of these two sources of information would vary
depending on the scope (basic vs. superordinate intention) and the
target of the intention (social vs. non-social intention) that had to
be inferred. To test this second hypothesis, we therefore
manipulated the type of intention underlying the observed action
using four distinct tasks (basic non-social, superordinate non-social,
basic social, and superordinate social tasks).
Two main results emerged. First, we observed that the
intentional judgment indeed rests on an interplay between the
participants’ prior expectations (their probability of being true
varied across the blocks) and the reliability of the sensory
information available from the action scene. When this reliability
decreased, the bias effect (i.e. the contribution of prior
expectations) on performance increased, with participants
responding more towards intentions they estimated as being the
most likely cause of the observed behaviour. Second, this
interaction was found to vary according to the type of intention,
defined here by its scope (basic vs. superordinate) or its target
(social vs. non-social). Indeed, directly comparing performance
between intentions of different scopes but identical targets, and
between intentions with the same scope but distinct targets,
revealed an increase in the bias effect for both superordinate and
social intentions. While this effect was only observed when the
amount of visual information was low in the basic task, it was
found to be significant for both low and moderate amounts of
information in the superordinate task, and for any amount of
visual information in the social conditions.
Taken together, these results indicate that the degree to which
the participants’ prior knowledge contributes is sensitive to the
type of intention that is focused on. As the intention being
considered becomes more abstract (from basic to superordinate,
and from non-social to social intentions), the inference problem
becomes less constrained (i.e. the number of intentions congruent
with visuomotor inputs increases): in this condition, participants’
prior expectations exerted an increasing influence on their
responses, to the detriment of the sensory information available
from the action scene.
Interaction between perceptual and prior information
In the 4 experiments in the present study, the degree to which
prior expectations contributed strongly depended on the reliability
of the visual information conveyed by the video scenes. In low
amount of visual information conditions, whatever the type of
intention, participants tended to give priority to likely intentions at
the expense of unlikely intentions; that is, they relied mostly on the
intention they estimated to be the most likely cause of what was
observed. This tendency towards favouring prior knowledge over
perceptual information may further be accounted for by
considering intentional inference as an inverse problem [1–3,14].
Inverse problems characterise situations in which the same sensory
input can have different causes. This type of problem is commonly
encountered in ambiguous perceptual tasks – such as those using
bi-stable or degraded stimuli – the resolution of which requires
appealing to prior knowledge or making further assumptions about
the nature of the observed phenomenon [43]. The significant
contribution of prior expectations in conditions of high visual
ambiguity precisely suggests that when sensory information was
not sufficient to unambiguously infer one intention, participants
compensated by massively appealing to their prior knowledge (i.e.
about the space of the agent’s possible intentions). This strategy
resulted in preferentially selecting actions achieving the intention
with the highest probability to occur.
Figure 8. Mean score (± SD) of the bias effect expressed as a percentage of correct responses. Left panel: comparison between
intentions with same target but different scopes (BASIC vs. SUPERORD.). Right panel: comparison between intentions with same scope but different
targets (SOCIAL vs. NON-SOCIAL).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017133.g008
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or incomplete data a successful inference depends on an adaptive
integration between bottom-up information (from the observation
of behaviour) and top-down prior knowledge about goals or
intentions [13]. This integration is consistent with a mechanism
complementing the available perceptual information when it does
not sufficiently constrain the number of potential solutions,
namely, the many competing intentions congruent with what is
observed. In line with this assumption, some authors have
suggested that inferring another person’s intention necessarily
requires sensorimotor information to be complemented with
information about mental states and attitudes [23]. It has been
demonstrated that prior expectations are already used frequently
by children, even at a very early age. This tendency combines with
a tendency to interpret actions as being directed towards a goal
(‘teleological obsession’, [3]). When the visual information is not
sufficient for interpreting the action as a goal directed one [44], or
when the action is incomplete [45], children posit states of the
world occasionally counterfactual to the perceptual evidence (such
as the presence of occluded physical objects). The results of the
present study are consistent with the existence of such a
mechanism of data completion/correction operating through the
default use of prior expectations. Crucially, however, we further
show that reliance on this mechanism also depends on the type of
the intention to be inferred, according to its scope (basic vs.
superordinate) or its target (non-social vs. social).
Basic vs. superordinate intentions
Both non-social basic and superordinate experiments required
recognising one motor act, with the superordinate condition also
requiring the final goal of the sequence (i.e. the shape being
constructed) to be taken into account. Yet, across both
experiments, prior expectations were found to differentially
contribute to the participants’ responses. In the basic non-social
experiment, a bias response towards the likely intention was only
observed in the condition where the amount of visual information
was low. When participants were exposed to a moderate amount
of visual information, these expectations no longer exerted an
influence on performance, which then substantially depended
upon the processing of the visual information alone. On the other
hand, a heightened contribution of these expectations is observed
in the superordinate experiments since they significantly influ-
enced participants’ performance in conditions of both low and
moderate amounts of visual information.
The increase in response bias in the superordinate experiment
cannot be explained by differences in complexity between both
tasks since participants performed at comparable levels across
basic and superordinate experiments showing that the differences
between both experiments in terms of contribution of prior
information are accounted for by the type of intention being
considered. This result may be explained by differences in the
relationship between these two types of intentions and action.
While basic intention stands to action in a one-to-one relation
(basic intentions like ‘transport’, ‘rotate’, or ‘lift’ an object are
indeed directly accessible to the viewer from mere observation of
the motor acts), superordinate intention stands to action in a
many-to-one relation since the very same intention can be
achieved by several distinct (commutative) sequences of actions.
In the present study, this commutative property resulted in an
ability of participants to infer the underlying intention solely on the
basis of visual information arising from the first two actions.
However, the present results also suggest that, despite the
unpredictability of the sequence, participants still initiated a
response, before observing the last action, by appealing massively
to their prior expectations. Participants’ dependence on priors in
this condition could precisely account for the fact that simulating the
motor acts composing the sequence (through motor mirroring,
[46–47]) was of little help to infer the final superordinate intention.
Those motor acts were indeed interchangeable within the
sequence itself, and, as a consequence, they did predict neither
the subsequent action nor the intention eventually achieved.
This early use of prior expectations might be accounted for by
the existence of a system that pre-processes the current action
chain depending on the sequences previously encountered.
Observing the beginning of an action, or a sequence of actions,
would automatically activate a representation of the likely
intention that would be progressively suppressed or reinforced as
the amount of visual information increases. Such a pre-processing
would be particularly salient in superordinate conditions, where
the beginning of the act chain proved to be of little importance for
inferring the final intention it achieved. As such, it would explain
why selecting an unlikely intention in bias sessions induced a
significant cost on participants’ performance. In these sessions,
selecting an unlikely intention would indeed imply disengaging
from the early activation of a likely intention. Finally, such pre-
processing may account for why prior expectations are favoured
over visual information in conditions of moderate perceptual
uncertainty, as it would account for the role that priors continue to
play when the amount of perceptual information increases. In
superordinate conditions, the current sequence of actions would
pre-activate the representation of the likely intention (i.e. the
intention with the highest probability) to such an extent that a
greater amount of visual information would be required to
counteract it.
Non-social vs. social intentions
Social experiments were characterized by participants’ respons-
es over-relying on prior expectations as revealed by responses
massively shifting towards likely intentions (i.e. ‘tit-for-tat’’
intention: cooperation if previous cooperation, defection if
previous defection) whatever the amount of visual information
available from the action scene. This increased reliance on prior
knowledge cannot be accounted for by differences in terms of
complexity between non-social and social experiments, namely a
greater memory load due to the requirement of tracking two
successive intentions – the first and the second player’s ones.
Indeed, participants performed equally well, in terms of correct
responses and reaction times, in both the social and non-social
experiments. Additionally, the effect of facilitation associated with
TFT strategy in the basic social experiment cannot be explained
by a visual priming effect of the first player’s action on the second
player’s one, which could have occurred when the latter
performed the same action as the former. Indeed, TFT strategy
was also found to be favoured in the superordinate social
experiment; yet in this study TFT strategy did not necessarily
imply that the action of the first player should be reproduced by
the second player.
The dependence of the participants on their prior knowledge
appears to reflect some expectations driven by the social context of
the task. It is well-known that even basic movements, like the
relative movements of geometrical figures, automatically induce
participants to perceive the figures as socially interacting [48–50],
and elicit strong expectations about the intentional causes of their
movements (e.g. striking, kissing, etc.). Situations identified as
involving social interactions are generally prone to trigger specific
expectations concerning the way agents are likely to behave in
such situations [12]. These expectations may be derived from
perceiving the other as an interaction partner rather than a
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diverse origins, such as that provided by group stereotypes [52],
social-specific naive theories [53], or an individual’s reputation
acquired from experience of reciprocal social interactions [10]. In
the present experiment, increased dependence on prior knowledge
for inferring social intentions, regardless of their scope, seems
precisely to fall within this type of expectation. Indeed, during the
whole task, increasing the frequency of the second player adopting
a TFT strategy amounted to progressively assigning a specific
reputation to that player. A bias in the response towards a ‘‘tit-for-
tat’’ mode of reciprocation reveals that participants did integrate
this reputational knowledge and made their response accordingly.
The pervasive effect of these specific expectations is also well
illustrated in the baseline condition by the early preference of
participants for the TFT reciprocation. Even before being biased
in this direction, participants tended to infer more rapidly that the
second player was more inclined to mirror the first player’s
strategy. This early preference was probabilistically reinforced in
the bias session and, as a consequence, exerted a greater influence
on the participants’ performance since it persisted even when the
reliability of the visual information was high. Indeed, while in the
basic non-social experiment the very same motor act presented
alone was inferred from a much lower amount of visual
information, in the social experiment a bias response towards
the likely social intention was still observed for a higher amount of
visual information. This shows that the influence of these
expectations in the bias session was such that the participants
had difficulty disengaging from their a priori expectations, resulting
in predicting a play congruent with prior expectations but
counterfactual to perceptual evidence. Similarly, these difficulties
could account for the cost in performance associated with the
selection of intentions that did not meet these expectations. In the
bias session, participants were indeed significantly less accurate
and were slower to select an unlikely intention (i.e. always defect,
always cooperate) when this selection required concomitantly
inhibiting the competing tit-for-tat intention.
Simulation vs. reasoning accounts of action
understanding
The two main results of the present study (interaction between
prior expectations and perceptual information and the modulation
of this interaction as a function of the type of intention) may help
reconcile the two major accounts of action understanding
developed over the last decade. On the simulation account, we
understand our conspecifics’ intention by literally simulating their
action via the activation of our own motor planning system. The
result of this process of internal replication is the selection, in the
observer’s own repertoire, of the intention that would have caused
the very same action. This type of explanation stresses the role of
sensory information, derived from the kinematics of the move-
ment, in action understanding [35]– irrespective of whether the
action is complete (the goal achieved is fully visible) or only
partially performed (the goal is hidden but can be predicted from
the unfolding action) [see 46]. In contrast, the ‘‘theory theory’’
account postulates that action understanding is based on
specialized inferential processes and mostly emphasizes the
contribution of the context-related prior knowledge. This
knowledge can either be derived from our intuitive theories of
human behaviour, or from the subject’s past experiences and rules
she has drawn from them [8,54,55].
A wealth of empirical data and theoretical works nowadays
converges on the idea that these two major classes of mechanisms
play a complementary role in intention inference [10,22,23,56].
The results of the present study comfort these observations. By
suggesting that intentional judgment relies on a relative balance of
bottom-up sensory and top-down prior information, they plead in
favour of a hybrid model of action understanding. In such a model,
the observer would mobilize either low-level simulation or high-
order inferential mechanisms depending on whether the current
sensory evidence is, or is not, reliable enough to elicit simulation
from observation.
Recently, Kilner and colleagues proposed a theoretical
framework that attempts to further account for how these two
classes of mechanisms may interact to enable one’s understanding
of other people’s intentions [1]. This framework relies on the
hierarchical architecture of action representations ranging from
the intention level to the kinematics level (see also [57]). In this
architecture, the selection of one type of action representation
would result from the resolution of the inverse problem at each
level of the hierarchy. Basically, each level uses a model to
generate a prediction of the representations in the level below.
This prediction is then compared with the representation at the
subordinate level and prediction errors arising from that
comparison are returned to the higher level to adjust its
representation. This adjustment is generalised to the different
levels of the hierarchy (intention, motor command and kinemat-
ics). The most likely cause of the observed action is then inferred
by minimising the prediction error at all the levels of this hierarchy
[1,2]. Given visual kinematics, goal expectations are first
generated, from these goal representations motor commands are
then predicted and given these motor commands, kinematics are
in turn predicted. In this framework, top-down influences are
therefore dynamically generated since the estimates produced at
the higher levels become prior expectations for the lower levels.
Our results can be consistently interpreted in the light of the
Kilner’s hierarchical model. A basic intention can be directly
predicted from the observation of the current motor act, provided
the related visual information is sufficient to enable comparison
with expected kinematics at higher levels. In this case, participants’
performance is strongly dependent on minimising the prediction
error that arises from this comparison. However, this comparison
also closely depends on the reliability of the current movement
kinematics; when the amount of visual information is too low, this
comparison cannot be made, and, as a result, subordinate levels
cannot adjust their representation to higher estimates of the
hierarchy. We observed that, when this comparison could not be
carried out, participants consistently appealed to their prior
knowledge. In a hierarchical model of action representations, such
an over-reliance on priors could be made possible by the existence
of a short circuitry of recursive loops between subordinate and
higher levels of the cortical hierarchy. These recursive loops would
be mobilized when data is sparse to shortcut the automatic
comparison process between observed and expected kinematics
movement. Importantly, the engagement of this mechanism
proved to be dependent on the amount of visual information
available from the action scene, but independent from the scope
and target of the intention, since it was observed to operate at the
lowest levels of visual information in each of the four experimental
conditions.
Noteworthily, the engagement of these recursive loops is also
sensitive to variations in the relationship between the observed
action and its goal. Superordinate conditions indeed involved a
greater recourse to participants’ prior expectations even when the
visual information significantly increased to a moderate (non-
social) or even a high level (social). This greater dependence on
prior expectations can be explained by the fact that, in
superordinate conditions, many competing intentions are congru-
ent with the visual information conveyed by the current motor act.
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and current kinematics may be sufficient to predict the agent’s
single act (e.g. to rotate), it may not be to infer unambiguously
which of the multiple superordinate intentions (e.g. final shapes) it
contributes to accomplish. As a consequence, we found the weight
of the decision to be mostly carried by participants’ prior
expectations, suggesting, in this situation of accrued perceptual
uncertainty, an early shortcut of the comparison process between
levels of the action representation hierarchy. Crucially, this
shortcut was independent of the amount of information, since it
occurred even when the visual information was high enough for
the participant to be normally confident about what she is seeing.
This observation suggests that recursive loops of this kind could be
mostly recruited in contexts where relying on one’s prior
expectations is a better guarantee for accurate inference, even if
such expectations can occasionally go against perceptual evidence.
Conclusion
Our results shed light on how sensory information, derived from
the kinematics of the observed action, interacts with prior
expectations to enable one’s understanding of other people’s
intentions. We first showed that the contribution of participants’
prior knowledge was sensitive to the availability of the sensory
information from the action scene. A greater contribution of this
knowledge was observed in conditions of sparse visual information,
suggesting the engagement of a mechanism of data completion
operating through the default use of prior expectations.
Second, we found that the priors’ contribution also depended
on the type of intention that was inferred. An increased reliance on
priors was indeed observed in conditions where the agent’s
intention could not be predicted by the sole visible, current motor
act, but further required estimating the superordinate goal this act
contributed to achieve. In this case, participants’ expectations –
being progressively acquired from observation – were found to
most frequently supersede the visual information conveyed by the
current motor kinematics. Thus, the more participants responded
towards the biased (e.g. expected) intentions, the more the visual
information tended to play a confirmatory, rather than a
predictive role. Such a shift in the contribution of visual evidence
is likely to account for why participants, in this condition, mostly
over-relied on their priors to make their decision, even though it
ran counter to the perceptual evidence.
Crucially, an over-reliance on priors was also massively
observed in social conditions. We suggested that the early
influence of social-specific expectations (e.g. expectations on how
agents are the most likely to behave in a context of reciprocal
interaction) may account for this important shift in the response
toward participants’ priors. Contexts of social interaction are
indeed prone to elicit modular, high-level expectations, which may
contribute to giving priority to some intentional causes (e.g.
cooperation if previous cooperation, defection if previous defec-
tion) at the expense of other competing causes. These a priori
expectations, being acquired from experience (probabilistic bias)
or derived from domain-specific knowledge (TFT reciprocation),
were found to favour some action representations so that less
sensory evidence was needed for the participants to be confident
about their decision, i.e. about which kind of intention was most
likely the cause of the observed action.
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